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Introduction
For decades American courts have pronounced that monopolies
cannot have goodwill or that a monopoly's goodwill is of no value.
The basis of this belief is that the monopolist's customers have no
choice but to patronize the monopoly firm. This proposition does not
withstand theoretical scrutiny. The value of goodwill to a firm is di-
rectly related to the elasticity' of demand for that firm's goods or serv-
ices. Monopoly power alone, however, is insufficient to measure the
elasticity of demand for those goods or services. The value of good-
will to a monopolist is also closely correlated to the ease by which
competitors may enter the market, for a monopolist's goodwill can be
a barrier to entry because potential entrants may perceive the good-
will as giving the monopolist a competitive advantage over any new
entrants.
In recent years this issue has evolved as one of particular interest
to the cable television industry. Popularly viewed as an industry of
small, regional monopolies, there is no question that cable television
companies exercise at least some monopolistic power. Because so
many of the assets of a cable television firm are intangible, and be-
cause in so many areas of law and regulation the size and nature of a
company's assets are important, the allocation of cable television com-
panies' assets to goodwill, if such goodwill can exist, has significant
consequences.
I
The History of the Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the principle that a monop-
oly cannot have goodwill or cannot assign value to goodwill as early as
1901 in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.2 At issue was the valuation of
the assets of the gas supplier for the city of New York. The Supreme
Court stated:
We are also of [the] opinion that it is not a case for a valuation of
"good will." . . . The complainant has a monopoly in fact, and a
consumer must take gas from it or go without. He will resort to the
"old stand," because he cannot get gas anywhere else.3
The very next year, in Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.,' the U.S.
Supreme Court revisited the issue. The city of Omaha had the right to
purchase its privately-owned water supplier; however, the private
1. Elasticity of demand is the responsiveness of consumers to changes in prices.
2. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
3. Id. at 52.
4. 218 U.S. 180 (1910).
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owners and the city litigated the price, which was dependent upon the
appraised value of the assets of the water supply system. With regard
to the value of goodwill in the water company, the Court noted that,
"[G]ood will.., is of little or no commercial value when the business
is, as here, a natural monopoly with which the customer must deal,
whether he will or no[t].
Since those early cases, the proposition that a monopolist cannot
value goodwill or cannot have goodwill has become almost an article
of faith, with significant consequences for income taxation, property
taxation and rate regulation for regulated industries, including cable
television.
II
The Income Tax Issue
The Internal Revenue Code, applicable tax rules and case law al-
low taxpayers to amortize intangible assets that have determinable
useful lives.6 Intangible assets without determinable useful lives, such
as goodwill, could not, until recently, be amortized.7 From this prohi-
bition has arisen one of the oldest controversies between the Internal
Revenue Service and taxpayers: How much of the intangible assets of
a firm are attributable to goodwill?8
The issue arose recently in Tele-Communications Inc. and Subsid-
iaries v. Commissioner.9 Tele-Communications, Inc. had purchased
three cable television franchises in Florida and Missouri and claimed
amortization deductions based on the difference between the
purchase price of the franchise and the value of the tangible assets of
each system. The IRS disallowed most of the deductions.
The IRS argued that much of the purchase price was considera-
tion for goodwill which, as a nondepreciable capital asset, could not be
included in the cost-basis amortization. Tele-Communications, Inc.
responded that "although there may be an element of going concern
value, each franchise benefited by operating in a de facto monopoly
which, by its nature, does not allow for the existence of 'goodwill."' 1
5. Id. at 202.
6. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
7. Id.
8. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-88, TAX POLICY: ISSUES AND
POLICY PROPOSALS REGARDING TAX TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 2 (1991).
9. 95 T.C. 495 (1990).
10. Id. at 519.
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The court accepted the reasoning of Tele-Communications, Inc.
in ruling that it had no goodwill because it was a monopoly. The court
stated, "On the basis of the facts presented, the concept of goodwill
has no application. Potential cable television subscribers have no al-
ternative but to go to the possessor of the right to deliver cable televi-
sion services and, therefore, goodwill does not exist in the traditional
sense."
11
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 expressly per-
mits, for the first time, the amortization of goodwill and other intangi-
ble assets without determinable useful lives.12 The amortization
period is fixed at fifteen years. 13 The existence and value of goodwill
will remain an issue, however, because different categories of assets
have different amortization schedules. For example, if goodwill may
be amortized more quickly than tangible personal property, a tax-
payer would argue for greater allocation of the price of the business to
goodwill.
III
The Property Tax Issue
Nationwide, counties and other local governments starved for
revenue by tax revolts are seeking new sources of revenue. Tax asses-
sors in many states have taken another look at property subject to ad
valorem taxation. In several instances, new theories have been ad-
vanced which result in substantial increases in the valuation of the
property and an accompanying increase in the tax upon that property.
The allocation of the value of an enterprise between taxable property
and other assets, therefore, becomes a major issue. Goodwill is one of
those other assets. The greater the value of an enterprise that may be
attributed to goodwill, the lesser the value of the firm that may be
taxable.
An example of the development of local laws raising the amount
of revenue generated from property taxes is the major battle currently
being fought in California between county assessors and cable televi-
sion companies over the value of possessory interests. Possessory in-
terests are the rights to use otherwise tax-exempt public property for
private purposes,'14 such as leases of park land for residences or con-
cessions. Cable television operators use public streets and other
11. Id. at 521.
12. Ominbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 312, 532 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 197).
13. Id. (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 197(a)).
14. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 107-107.7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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rights-of-way for their cable plants, and it is the value of the posses-
sory interests in these public rights-of-way that is at the heart of the
controversy.
Possessory interests in public rights-of-way of the type used by
cable television companies are difficult to appraise directly. There is
no market price for such rights-of-way because the supply exceeds the
demand and the price is regulated by law. Utility poles and streets
have the capacity to provide space to more users than those seeking to
use such rights-of-way. The cable television company, telephone com-
pany and power company do not use up all of the space on the poles






As illustrated by Figure A above, there is no marginal cost to the
owner of the rights-of-way for additional users up to the limit of the
capacity of the telephone poles and streets to accommodate wires and
pipelines (QL). Above that limit, however, supply of space in the
rights-of-way is unavailable at any price. On the demand side, how-
ever, the number of potential users is exhausted before the supply.
Thus, the supply and demand "curves" never intersect, so there is no
determinable equilibrium price.
The owner of the rights-of-way, the local municipality, is a mo-
nopolist, so it could artificially restrict the supply. Theoretically, the
municipality could exact from each utility and cable television com-
pany a price equal to the value of the use of the rights-of-way. As a
practical matter, however, the municipality is incapable of determin-
ing what that value is (which is, after all, the point of this exercise), so
the outcome could be any price between zero and the value of the
possessory interest to the buyer. The outcome of this game, that is,
what is the price for the use of the rights-of-way, is unclear. It would
depend upon factors external to the value of the property, such as the
political influence of the buyers or of the consumers who ultimately
19941
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pay the buyers' costs, the need of the municipalities for revenue and
the relative nerve of the negotiators.
This game is not played in fact, because the prices municipalities
may charge for public rights-of-way are regulated. In California, the
telephone companies cannot be charged by municipalities for use of
the public rights-of-way.15 Electric and gas utilities may be charged a
"franchise fee" of no more than two percent of the utility's gross reve-
nues from that municipality.' 6 Cable television operators may be
charged a "franchise fee" of no more than five percent of their gross
revenues.' 7 The "franchise fee" pays for both the right to do business
and the actual access to the public rights-of-way,' 8 so not all of the
franchise fee can be said to be paid for such access.
Thus, it is difficult to determine how much is actually paid for the
use of the public rights-of-way, much less what the price would be if
the market was unregulated. Methods other than reference to the
market price, therefore, must be used to estimate the value of such
possessory interests.
One of the methods being used to value possessory interests is
the unitary method, which consists of appraising the value of the en-
tire cable television enterprise, then subtracting the value of all but
possessory interests. The cable system's intangible assets, including
goodwill, are among those assets that are not possessory interests,
and, therefore, their value must be subtracted from the enterprise
value to determine the value of the possessory interests. Thus, in uni-
tary-method appraisals of possessory interests, the greater the value of
goodwill, the lower the resulting appraisal of the possessory interests.
An alternative method of appraising possessory interests is to es-
timate the amount of the cable operator's income that should be at-
tributed to the possessory interests, and then determine the present
value of that stream of income over the life of the franchise. This
exercise in metaphysics has not been made any easier by California
state court decisions. Decisions on this issue have stated that, despite
California law prohibiting ad valorem taxation of intangible assets, the
value of intangible assets may be taken into account in the appraisal
of tangible assets to the extent the intangible assets enhance the value
of the tangible assets.' 9 Goodwill is not among the intangible assets
15. Section 7901 of California's Public Utilities Code grants telephone utilities a state-
wide franchise, foreclosing local franchising and regulation.
16. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 6231 (West 1987).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1993).
18. County of Stanislaus v. County of Stanislaus Assessment Appeals Bd., 213 Cal.
App. 3d 1445, 1455 (1989); Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal. 2d 280, 285 (1948).
19. County of Stanislaus, 213 Cal.App.3d at 1445.
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that allegedly enhance the value of the possessory interests, so any
income attributable to the goodwill of the cable operator cannot be
imputed to the possessory interests.
California's county assessors use an elaborate appraisal of the
possessory interests of Viacom's California cable systems in their task
of appraising possessory interests held by cable television concerns.
Appraisal of Viacom's possessory interests was a collaborative effort
of assessors from ten California counties. In its discussion of goodwill,
the Viacom appraisal quotes a 1982 appraisal of Wisconsin Cablecom-
General cable television systems which states:
Customer loyalty and customer referrals are valuable elements of
goodwill when a newly acquired business operates in a competitive
environment. Since cable television franchisees enjoy apparent ex-
clusivity, subscribers have no choice except to patronize the sole au-
thorized system in their area. There is no indication that customer
loyalty has been established where no competition to test the loy-
alty of customers exists. Therefore, no goodwill of this type can be
assumed to exist.2°
"From this discussion," conclude the ten California County Assessors,
"it would appear that in a defacto [sic] monopoly situation such as
Viacom enjoys, goodwill either does not exist, or if its existence is con-
ceded, its market value is $0.
'21
The issue of how to appraise possessory interests is not unique to
California. The assessor of Lincoln Parish, Louisiana argues that uni-
tary methods of appraisal are appropriate for use in property tax as-
sessments of cable television systems because any and all of their
intangible assets enhance the value of their tangible assets. With re-
gard to goodwill, she writes:
My question to cable TV representatives is: "Where is the 'goodwill'
in a monopoly?" The answer to both this question and the valua-
tion of so-called "goodwill" in cable TV systems is one and the
same-there is "no goodwill" in monopoly cable systems, and there
should be no assessment for same.22
20. Richard Benson et al., Appraisal of the Property of Viacom Cable, Inc., located in
the Counties of: Alameda, Butte, Contra Costa, Colusa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco,
Shasta, Sonoma and Tehema as of March 9, 1987, at 183 [hereinafter Appraisal of Viacom]
(quoting Bond, Appraisal of Assets Cablecom-General Cable Television Systems and Cor-
porate Divisions as of April and May, 1982, at 184-85).
21. Id.
22. Jewette Farley, A Question of Fairness-The Cable TV Issue, ASSESSMENT J., Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 2, 14-15 (originally presented as a paper at the 1993 International Association
of Assessing Officers conference in Washington, D.C.) (1993).
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The Rate Regulation Issue
Most of the established case law on the subject of the existence of
goodwill in monopolies has arisen in the context of determining
whether the rates regulators have permitted utilities to charge are
confiscatory. The issue in these cases has been whether the rates have
been set so low as to constitute a taking of the regulated company's
property by the government.23 Among the considerations in setting
rates is the size of the company's assets, so that the rate of return
earned by investors on those assets may be determined. The existence
and value of goodwill may have a substantial impact upon the mea-
surement of the assets of the utility and on the revenues necessary to
generate a given rate of return and, thus, on the rates the utility may
charge.
Whether the existence of goodwill favors the regulators or the
regulated industry is not consistent. If the regulations are based on
guaranteeing a fair return on all assets, then the greater the goodwill
of a company in the regulated industry, the higher the rates it may
charge. On the other hand, rate regulations often exclude from con-
sideration certain categories of assets, such as goodwill. In such cases,
the company will argue that little of its value should be allocated to
goodwill.
Teleprompter Cable Communications Corporation found itself in
the latter situation when it appealed the rejection of a rate increase
application by the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commission-
ers.24 On appeal, Teleprompter argued that the regulators had not
properly distinguished between goodwill and the firm's going concern
value.25 Going concern value was includable in the "rate base,"
whereas goodwill was not. The court rejected Teleprompter's argu-
ment because it had not been raised before,26 but did note in a brief
survey of the law that goodwill "is not properly includable in the rate
base of a monopoly." 27
23. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 821 (1989).
24. Teleprompter Cable Communications Corp. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 380
A.2d 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
25. Id. at 1144.
26. Id. at 1145.
27. Id. The authority cited by the court is Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New
York, 212 U.S. 19 (1909), which did not hold, as a matter of law, that goodwill should be
excluded from the rate base of a monopoly. Rather, Wilcox held that, as a matter of uni-
versal fact, a monopoly cannot have goodwill, so there is none to include in its rate base.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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More recently, the Federal Communications Commission, as part
of its charge under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, is developing rules by which cable television
companies may be able to seek exceptions to the price "benchmarks"
established by the FCC by showing that the benchmark rates are un-
reasonable given the actual costs of service. Although the
benchmarks are in place, the FCC has not yet established the cost-of-
service rules. The FCC has, however, tentatively decided that good-
will may not be included in the rate base to be used for cost-of-service
showings.2 8
V
The Definition of Goodwill
Federal tax law cases have defined goodwill as follows:
In tax law, it is well established that the "nature of goodwill is the
expectancy that 'old customers will resort to the old place."' The
essence of goodwill is the expectancy of continued patronage, for
whatever reason.29
The Wisconsin appraisal of Cablecom-General quoted in the Cal-
ifornia appraisal of Viacom defines goodwill as "goodwill established
through competition."30
The dictionary defines goodwill as "benevolent interest or con-
cern; a kindly feeling of approval."31
None of the above definitions is very rigorous and, therefore,
none lends itself to fruitful analysis. However, examination of how
the concept of goodwill is used reveals its elements.
Goodwill is a demand-side phenomenon. That is, the effect of
goodwill is to increase demand for a firm's goods or services, which
enables the firm benefiting from the goodwill to sell more, increase its
price, or both. Demand may also be increased by any number of fac-
tors which would not qualify as goodwill, such as product differentia-
tion. Goodwill, therefore, is a category of factors that increase
demand yet escapes precise definition and measurement. Those fac-
28. Cable Television Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 40762, (1993) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 76) (proposed July 15, 1993). In fact, the FCC has tentatively decided that no
acquisition costs in excess of the original cost of the cable operator's tangible assets may be
included in the ratebase.
29. Tele-Communications, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 495, 521 (1990)
(citations omitted).
30. Benson, supra note 20, at 182 (quoting Bond, Appraisal of Assets Cablecom-Gen-
eral Cable Television Systems and Corporate Divisions as of April and May 1982, at 184-
85).
31. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 496 (1991).
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tors would include benevolent feelings on the part of consumers, force
of habit from a firm's long tenure in the community and the firm's
reputation.
Goodwill as a business asset is sometimes defined in terms of
competition-as the tendency of a business, because of its reputation,
to attract customers who might otherwise go to a competitor. This
might also be described as a friendlier disposition on the part of the
customers to a particular business over its competitors.
Goodwill may also be defined without mention of competition,
however, as the tendency of a business, because of its reputation, to
attract customers who might not otherwise patronize that business.
That is, a business may be the beneficiary of a friendly disposition on
the part of its customers regardless of the existence of competition.
When goodwill is defined as requiring an element of competition,
there is a question of whether a monopolist can have goodwill. How-
ever, conceptually, a monopoly could benefit from a friendly disposi-
tion on the part of potential customers regardless of the existence of
competitors. That is, there are customers whose choice is between
purchasing the monopolist's product and not purchasing that product
at all. The decision of those potential customers whether to purchase
a certain good or service may, at the margin, depend upon the reputa-
tion of the seller.
VI
The Value of Goodwill to a Monopolist
The ability of any firm, including a monopolist, to attract custom-
ers because of its reputation, service and the fact that its potential
patrons feel good about patronizing it, would be a valuable asset un-
less the firm is operating in a market in which demand for its goods or
services is unrelated to price and service. Only the firm that can sell
its products at any price will assign no value to goodwill's ability to
attract customers. That is, the value of goodwill is correlated with the
elasticity of demand for the firm's goods or services, and the existence
of monopoly power reduces the value of goodwill only to the same
extent that monopoly power necessarily implies lower elasticity of
demand.
[Vol. 16:265











Figures B and C each show the market demand for a product. De-
mand for the product in Figure C is more elastic than is demand for
the product in Figure B; demand is more sensitive to changes in price.
The same price change, from P, to P2, results in a larger change in
consumption in market C than in market B (i.e., Qc2-QCl>QB2-QB1.)
In a competitive market, an individual firm has virtually no ability
to set prices. Each individual firm is relatively insignificant, so any
increase above the price being charged by competitors (e.g., P1 to P2)







To the individual firm in a competitive market, therefore, demand is
infinitely elastic. The presence of goodwill, however, permits the firm
to differentiate itself from its competitors and charge a higher price.
Figure E
Price / Supply
P2 " Demand with goodwill
P, Demand without goodwill
Quantity
The increase in the firm's profits is represented by the area between P1
and P2 and to the left of the supply curve.
The ability of a competitive firm, through an investment in good-
will, to increase demand for its products or services can be understood
intuitively by thinking of the price of those products or services as
consisting of all demand factors, not just the amount of money with
which one must part to acquire the good or service. That is, money is
only part of the price paid by consumers for purchases. Consumers
also pay with their time spent shopping and with the difficulty of ob-
taining and evaluating product information. For example, some con-
sumers still purchase goods at full retail price, despite the proliferation
of discounters such as Wal-Mart, Target and Costco, because they
value the service and atmosphere provided by full-service retailers
more than the dollar price difference between the full-service retailer
and the discounter.
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Thus, the overall price of a good can be reduced if, the dollar
price being equal, the level of service offered to the customer in-
creases. Consumers' impressions that a seller offers superior service is
goodwill. The presence of goodwill, therefore, is the belief by con-
sumers that the overall price for a good is lower at the business which
is the beneficiary of the goodwill.
Whether a consumer purchases a good or service or how much of
a good or service to buy is decided by weighing the marginal benefit
or attractiveness of that purchase against alternative uses for the re-
sources used to make the purchase-the overall price as defined
above. Consumers who perceive the marginal benefit of a purchase to
be high will make the purchase, and would, in fact, make the purchase
even if the price were higher. At any price level, however, there are
purchasers and potential purchasers for whom the decision is very
close, for whom the marginal benefit of the purchase is very small
compared with the price. It is those consumers whose decision to
purchase may be influenced by how good they feel about the company
from which they are considering making the purchase.
All of the discussion set forth above applies equally well to mo-
nopolists as to companies in a competitive market. The difference be-
tween a monopolist and a company in a competitive market is that the
monopolist is the only producer or supplier in the market. This has
two primary implications.
First, a price increase by the monopolist, unlike a price increase
by a company in the competitive market, does not result in wholesale
desertion of its customers to competitors. As long as demand is elastic
at all, however, a price increase (from, for example, P1 to P2) would






Second, unlike the company in the competitive market, the price
charged by the monopolist is greater than its marginal revenue, the
1994]
additional revenue to be gained from each additional sale. The mar-
ket price represents marginal revenue for a competitive company
which produces an insignificant portion of the entire market supply,
and, therefore, cannot individually affect the market price for its
goods or services. The monopolist, on the other hand, is the only pro-
ducer, so if it increases production, it must reduce the price it charges
(which is the same as the market price) in order to sell the additional
units produced. The monopolist has to reduce the price of all of its
units, not just those representing the increased production, so the
marginal revenue from each additional sale by the monopolist is lower
than the price because the supply increase depresses the price for all





As illustrated in Figure G, for example, the increase in produc-
tion from Q1 to Q2 forces the price charged to drop from P1 to P2.
That new lower price, however, is charged for all items sold, including
the Q1 items formerly sold at the higher price. Thus, the monopolist
gains (Q 2-Q 1)P2, but loses Ql(PI-P 2). In fact, if the monopolist's de-
mand curve is linear and downward-sloping, the marginal revenue
curve bisects the demand curve.
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Profits are maximized, both for the monopolist and for the com-
panies in a competitive market, when the marginal revenues are equal
to the marginal costs of production (i.e., when there is no more profit
to be made from additional sales). In the competitive market, the
marginal revenue is the price, so the price charged is equal to the mar-
ginal cost. A monopolist's marginal revenues, however, are lower
than the price, so the price is higher than the marginal cost of produc-
tion at its profit-maximizing point. That difference between the cost
of production and the price is the "surplus," or monopoly profit,











If a monopolist invests in goodwill, then its demand function
moves vertically by the amount of the monetary value to its customers
of the improved service or reputation. The monopolist, thus, is able to









Rn Demand with Goodwill
Q1 Q2  Quantity
The increase in profit to the monopolist from its investment in good-
will is P2Q2 minus PIQ 1 minus the area between Q1 and Q2 below the
supply curve.
Therefore, goodwill, defined as the ability to charge a higher
monetary price without losing customers (because those customers
perceive that the firm offers savings in terms of service and quality),
should be of benefit and value to a monopolist.
Judge Goffe in the Tele-Communications, Inc. case recognized
that a monopolist can benefit from and, therefore, value goodwill:
At the time petitioner acquired the Jefferson City and Titusville
cable systems, there were a large number of subscriber complaints
because Athena's poor financial condition prevented it from mak-
ing the investment necessary to provide a satisfactory level of ser-
vice in those communities. Customer satisfaction, or lack of it, was
not a factor petitioner considered when valuing a cable system
before purchasing it. In fact, the poor reputation of an existing
franchisee often works to the buyer's advantage because the buyer
then has the opportunity to improve the system.
32
The opportunity to improve the system's reputation for service could
work to the buyer's advantage only if such improvements would in-
crease the number of subscribers and/or the price that could be
charged to subscribers. Therefore, Judge Goffe recognized that good-
will exists even in what he considers a monopoly.
A monopolist should be more interested in goodwill than a com-
petitive firm. One of the essential attributes of a competitive market
is equality of opportunity among the firms in the market. That is, any-
thing one firm can do another can also do, and entry into and exit
from the market are easy. Thus, a firm in a competitive market that
gains an advantage by an investment in goodwill should find that the
advantage is only momentary. Moreover, since the other firms in the
32. Tele-Communications, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 495, 502 (1990).
[Vol. 16:265
COEXISTENCE OF MONOPOLY POWER AND GOODWILL
market will react by investing in goodwill themselves, potential new
entrants, seeing one firm beginning to make extra profits, will be in-
duced to enter the market.
The monopolist, on the other hand, is a monopolist because there
is some barrier to entry by other firms. The monopolist, therefore,
should be able to enjoy the extra profits generated by its investment in
goodwill for as long as the barriers to entry persist.
Goodwill exists as long as demand is at all elastic. Only the mo-
nopolist with inelastic demand-demand insensitive to price-will as-
sign no value to goodwill. If consumers' behavior is independent of
the price for the goods or services, the monopolist already has the
ability to sell at any price it chooses, so a friendly disposition on the






As illustrated in Figure K, vertical movement of the demand curve
due to the presence of goodwill has no impact, in contrast to the case
when demand is at all elastic.33 That is, when demand is perfectly
inelastic, nothing the seller can do, short of ceasing production alto-
gether, will influence the quantity to be purchased. The seller has no
incentive, therefore, to care what purchasers think. Goods or services
with perfectly inelastic demand are rare or non-existent, but short-
term residential demand for public utilities such as electricity, natural
gas and water, is a good example which comes close. In the short run,
for instance, increases in price for natural gas will not affect residen-
tial consumption, because the need for heat and to cook remains con-
stant, and adjustment to less expensive alternatives takes time and is,
itself, costly.
The cases that established the rule followed in the Tele-Commu-
nications, Inc. case were ones involving the regulation of public utili-
33. See Figure J supra.
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ties. Although those cases concluded there could not be goodwill in a
monopoly, the analyses used by the courts imply that the monopolists
in question in those cases were facing inelastic demand.
For example, in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,34 the Supreme
Court at least implicitly recognized that the absence of consumer
choice (inelasticity of demand) rendered goodwill of no value to the
supplier of natural gas for the city of New York:
We are also of [the] opinion that it is not a case for a valuation of
"good will." . . . The complainant has a monopoly in fact, and a
consumer must take gas from it or go without. He will resort to the"old stand," because he cannot get gas anywhere else.35
Similarly, in Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.,36 the Supreme Court
noted that the municipal water supplier had inelastic demand because,
"the business is, as here, a natural monopoly with which the customer
must deal, whether he will or no[t]."37 The Supreme Court, thus, in
both cases found both that the utility was a monopoly and that cus-
tomers had no choice but to patronize it-that demand was inelastic.
Later cases have used the concepts less carefully but, with the excep-
tion of the Tele-Communications, Inc. case, have usually arrived at the
correct result nonetheless.
In Montgomery Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States,38 the
plaintiff corporation owned Coca-Cola bottling franchises and leased
them to partnerships owned by plaintiff's shareholders. The contro-
versy was how much of the premium paid to the plaintiff corporation
by the partnerships over the cost of the syrup purchased from Coca-
Cola was royalties for the franchise. The plaintiff argued that the gov-
ernment had undervalued the leaseholds by not assigning value to
goodwill. The court ruled that the bottling franchises had no goodwill,
because any goodwill attached solely to the product and was, there-
fore, an asset of the Coca-Cola company, not of its bottlers. The court
also noted that each bottler had an exclusive territory and was, there-
fore, a monopolist, and, "since the potential customers have no alter-
native to go to the possessor of the right, there may be no goodwill in
the traditional sense."39
The court's decision as stated is rife with confusion over whether
the appropriate market for analysis is the retail market or the whole-
sale market. The court is probably correct in stating that any goodwill
34. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
35. Id. at 52.
36. 218 U.S. 180 (1910).
37. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
38. 615 F.2d 1318 (Ct. CI. 1980).
39. Id. at 1332.
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on the part of retail consumers of Coca-Cola products is an asset of
Coca-Cola, independent of who bottles and distributes the product.
The bottlers' customers, however, are retail sellers, not consumers, so
it is conceivable that the goodwill of those retailers was an asset of the
bottlers. Nonetheless, given the large amount of consumer goodwill
owned by Coca-Cola, demand for Coca-Cola by retailers within a
price range not too far above the prices charged by competitors is
probably inelastic. That is, unless the wholesale price of Coca-Cola is
significantly greater than that of Pepsi-Cola, a retailer is virtually re-
quired to carry Coca-Cola. Thus, it is quite possible that the court was
correct in stating that the goodwill of retailers had no value to the
bottler because it was a monopolist and because demand for its prod-
ucts was inelastic.
Thus, there is no logical reason why a monopolist could not have
goodwill. The very fact that a monopolist, or any firm, faces price-
sensitive demand for its products implies the potential existence and
value of goodwill. The value of goodwill, however, is correlated with
the degree of elasticity of demand.
VII
Monopoly Power and Elasticity of Demand
A monopoly is a firm that is alone in its market. Unfortunately,
defining the relevant market in order to determine whether a firm is
alone in it is not simple. Cable television operators, for example, are
almost always the sole providers of cable television services in their
franchise areas, but they face substantial competition for consumers'
dollars from purveyors of alternative forms of entertainment, such as
broadcast television,"° video rentals4 and movies. On the horizon are
other methods of delivering multichannel video entertainment to
households, such as Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) and Multichan-
nel Multipoint Distribution Systems (MMDS or "wireless cable")
which will increase the level of competition with cable television.
Thinking in terms of degrees of monopoly power, then, is more
useful than thinking in absolutes. Currently, cable television opera-
tors have monopoly power because competitive products are not close
substitutes. Broadcast television offers significantly fewer channels.
40. A strong negative correlation has been observed between the number of broadcast
television signals available (up to five) and the rate of penetration of cable television sub-
scriptions. James Dertouzos and Steven Wildman, Problems with Penetration Standards, a
report to the National Cable Television Association 6 (Feb. 12, 1991 draft).
41. A strong negative correlation has been observed between the percentage of homes
owning video cassette recorders and penetration of cable television subscriptions. Id.
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Video rentals are more expensive per viewing and require that a cus-
tomer leave home to rent and to return the tape.
The greater the monopoly power, the lesser the elasticity of de-
mand. For example, while increases in the price of cable television
subscriptions would cause some customers to defect to alternative
forms of entertainment, other customers would remain, thinking that
the alternatives are still more expensive in terms of money, inconven-
ience and time, and that the other products are still not sufficiently
good substitutes to offset the higher price of cable television. How-
ever, upon the advent of DBS and MMDS, subscribers to cable televi-
sion will be much more readily driven away from cable television by
price increases because of the availability of closer substitutes. Thus,
greater competition means greater elasticity of demand.
The correlation between monopoly power and elasticity of de-
mand is not absolute, however, because consumers often have avail-
able to them the choice of not consuming the monopolist's product at
all. Even if cable television were truly a monopoly, with no competi-
tion whatsoever, it would not face inelastic demand and would value
goodwill, because cable television programming is not a necessity. At
some price, potential subscribers will decline to subscribe regardless
of the availability of alternatives. This is in contrast to the customers
of the gas company in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. and the custom-
ers of the water company in Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., who must
patronize those firms in order to obtain such necessities as heat and
fresh water. At the margin, the goodwill, or lack thereof, of the cable
television operator will make the difference in the decisions of some
potential cable television subscribers.
VIII
The Value of Goodwill as a Deterrent to Entry
Goodwill also has value to a monopolist as a deterrent to entry by
potential competitors. For example, an MMDS or DBS operator is
much more likely to enter a cable television operator's market if the
cable television operator has a poor reputation for service. There, the
prospects for stealing the cable system's subscribers would be much
better than if the cable system had a good relationship with its public.
A smart cable television operator, therefore, will value goodwill now
even though competition from MMDS and DBS does not yet exist.
The concept that the value of goodwill is correlated with the like-
lihood of entry into a market where incumbents have monopoly
power is not different from the correlation between elasticity of de-
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mand and the value of goodwill. The likelihood of entry is nothing
more than long-term elasticity.
Ix
The Experience of the Cable Television Industry
Empirically, the experience of the cable television industry has
proven to cable television operators the value of goodwill among the
residents of its franchise area. In recent years, the National Cable Tel-
evision Association created customer service standards for its mem-
bers, which include answering the telephone within thirty seconds,
keeping service appointments and resolving billing questions
quickly.42 Although one motive for creating such standards appears
undoubtedly political-improving the industry's popularity to defuse
political backlash from a poor reputation for customer service-the
motive for adoption of the standards by individual cable operators
was to increase goodwill and, thereby, increase revenues.
The evidence for the latter is largely anecdotal, but it is compel-
ling. For example, in Long Beach, California, Simmons Communica-
tion purchased a cable system with a terrible reputation for customer
service. Simmons imposed customer service standards, improved ser-
vice by reducing outages and became actively engaged in the commu-
nity through fundraisers for local charities. As a result, "churn"
(turnover of subscribers) was reduced by thirty percent, as was the
system's bad-debt ratio.43 Thus, improved service and image meant
that customers who would formerly have cancelled their subscriptions
did not and customers who formerly would have refused to pay their
bills paid.
Further evidence of the interest of cable television operators in
creating goodwill may be found in the advertisements that grace the
pages of cable television industry publications, such as Multichannel
News. Companies, such as Electronic Data Systems Corporation
(EDS), place advertisements aimed at cable operators which describe
ways the operators can serve their customers better.44 The inference
is that cable operators will invest in services and products if those
services and products will create goodwill among customers.
42. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, RECOMMENDED CABLE INDUSTRY CUS-
TOMER SERVICE STANDARDS (1990).
43. John M. Higgins & Linda Haugstead, Shrinking Simmons Wants to Grow Again,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 5, 1992, at 44.
44. E.g., EDS advertisement, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar 22, 1993, at 26-27 (Ads say
such things as, "So your customers receive immediate attention" and "systems that best




The value of goodwill to any business, including a cable television
operator, is primarily a function of the elasticity of demand for that
business' products. Because monopoly power is correlated with in-
elasticity of demand, the more monopoly power exercised by a busi-
ness, the lower the value of goodwill to that business. Monopoly
power, however, is not the only determinant of elasticity of demand,
so even a monopolist may face elastic demand, and, thus, assign value
to goodwill. To the extent that monopoly power does not necessarily
imply inelastic demand, the presence of monopoly power enables a
firm to retain more of the benefits of the presence of goodwill than
could a competitive firm, thus making goodwill possibly even more
valuable to a monopolist than to a competitive firm in a similar mar-
ket. Finally, to the extent that firms look to the future, even a monop-
olist facing perfectly inelastic demand might value goodwill as a
deterrent to entry by potential competitors.
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